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What does ‘utmost good faith’ mean? 
 
In English insurance law the duty of utmost good faith separates the insurance law 
principles from contract law principles for the reason that whilst the former requires 
volunteering material facts before the contract was concluded, the latter does not impose 
such an obligation on the contracting parties. The duty of disclosure was first recognised 
by Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm1 and it has continuingly been developed by the case 
law for centuries. The duty was first codified (together with the duty not to misrepresent 
material facts at the pre-contractual stage) by sections 18-20 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906.2 Recently the English Insurance Act 20153 repealed4 sections 18-20 of the MIA 
1906 but retained and therefore re-codified some of the principles established under these 
sections already. Under the 2015 Act the pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith is 
renamed as the ‘duty of fair presentation of the risk’. Moreover, the 2015 Act codified 
some of the common law principles5 developed since the MIA 1906 came into force and 
also brought clarifications to some issues such as ‘knowledge of insurer’6 and ‘knowledge 
of assured’7 in relation to the fair presentation of the risk. Major changes have been 
introduced on the remedy for breach of the pre-contractual fair presentation of the risk.8 
Part of section 17 of the MIA 1906 was repealed but the first sentence of the section ie “A 
contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith” was left 
unscathed. Thus, before and after the 2015 Act contracts of marine insurance (and non-
marine insurance)9 are contracts based upon the utmost good faith. Under the MIA 1906 it 
was discussed whether section 17, ie the duty of utmost good faith, was illustrated 
exhaustively10 by sections 18-20 of the MIA 1906.11 The 2015 Act, by renaming the pre-
contractual duties as the duty of ‘fair presentation of the risk’ and retaining the first 
sentence of section 17 of the MIA 1906 has clarified that the duty of utmost good faith is 
not confined to the duty of fair presentation of the risk only. Before the 2015 Act 
controversies arose mostly because the only remedy, which could be draconian in some 
circumstances, for breach of the duty of utmost good faith was the avoidance of the 
contract ab ibinitio. The 2015 Act introduced series of remedies for breach of the fair 
presentation of the risk in proportion to the seriousness of the breach.12 The duty of fair 
presentation of the risk derives from the duty of utmost good. As the case law illustrated 
the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is broader than the pre-contractual duties. Its 
implications have been discussed by English courts13 in various different contexts in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905. 
2 MIA 1906 hereinafter. 
3 The 2015 Act hereinafter.  
4 The Insurance Act 2015 section 21(2). 
5 For instance inducement has become a statutory test under the Insurance Act 2015 section 8(1). 
6 Section 5 
7 Section 4 
8 The Insurance Act 2015 introduced proportionate remedy depending on the breach being deliberate or 
reckless or neither deliberate nor reckless. See Schedule 1.  
9 The principles of the duty of good faith under the MIA 1906 applied to marine and non-marine 
insurance Joel v Law Union & Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 K.B. 863; Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v 
Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2003] 1 A.C. 469, Lord Hobhouse, para 4. (The Star Sea 
hereinafter). 
10 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, Sweet and Maxwell, 2016, para 6-004. 
11 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469; K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian 
Continent) [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 563. 
12 The Insurance 2015 Schedule 1.  
13 As seen in the following paragraphs.  
which the definition of good faith, the scope of the duty of good faith and remedy for its 
breach have been referred to but determined authoritatively. In this article the meaning of 
the ‘utmost good faith’ will be discussed and different forms of illustrations of the ‘utmost 
good faith’ in the contractual relationships between insurer and assured will be analysed. 
  
Development of the duty of utmost good faith  
 
The rationale for adopting the duty of disclosure is that when the assured conceals 
material facts the insurer agrees to insure on the false estimate of the risk.14 Lord 
Mansfield said in Carter v Boehm:15 “Insurance is a contract upon speculation. The 
special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most 
commonly in the knowledge of the insured only; the under-writer trusts to his 
representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back any 
circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the under-writer into a belief that the 
circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque, as if it did not 
exist. The keeping back such circumstance is a fraud, and therefore the policy is 
void.16 Although the suppression should happen through mistake, without any 
fraudulent intention; yet still the under-writer is deceived, and the policy is void; 
because the risque run is really different from the risque understood and intended to 
be run, at the time of the agreement.” His Lordship added that the rule about duty of 
disclosure is to provide fair presentation of the risk and also to prevent fraud and to 
encourage good faith.17  
 
In the nineteenth century the cases referred to the ‘duty of utmost good faith’ to 
express the ‘pre-contractual duty of disclosure’ and the ‘duty not to misrepresent 
material facts’.18 Those cases also expressed that the parties are subject to the duty of 
good faith throughout their contractual relationship.19 The MIA 1906 codified the 
principles set out over 2000 cases decided before the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Section 18 set out duties in relation to the pre-contractual disclosure; the 
agent’s duty of disclosure was codified by section 19 and misrepresentation was 
referred to under section 20. Section 17, as well as confirming that contracts of 
marine insurance are contracts based upon the utmost good faith, added that if the 
parties do not observe good faith the contract is avoidable. Sections 18-20 did not 
refer to any remedies for breach of the pre-contractual duties as set out by the relevant 
sections. The courts applied the remedy stated under section 17 and the insurers who 
proved the assured’s breach of the pre- contractual duties with regard to the 
representation of the risk were entitled to avoid the contract. Avoidance was the only 
recognized remedy under English law for breach of the pre-contractual duties. 
Demands on alternative remedies, such as claiming damages for the breach instead of 
avoiding the contract ab initio, were rejected by the Courts.20  
 
The duties as set out under the MIA 1906 were therefore called a one way street21 for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905. 
15 (1766) 3 Burrow 1905, 1909. 
16 As the law developed the remedy for breach of the pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith became 
‘avoidance’ of the contracts. Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Cowp. 785. 
17 (1766) 3 Burrow 1905, 1911. 
18 Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App. Cas. 925; Rozanes v Bowen (1928) 32 Ll. L. Rep. 98. 
19 Britton v The Royal Insurance Company (1866) 4 F. & F. 905, 909. 
20 Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co [1991] 2 A.C. 249. 
21 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36 Kirby J para 127. 
the reason that –although rarely- if an insurer is in breach of the pre-contractual duties 
it would not be desirable for the assured to avoid the contract especially if the assured 
discovers the breach after the occurrence of the loss. As will be seen throughout this 
article, insurers’ duty of utmost good faith becomes visible mostly at the post 
contractual stage including after the assured makes a claim. If the duty of utmost good 
faith is breached at the post contractual stage either by the assured or the insurer the 
MIA 1906 section 17 did not provide a satisfactory remedy for such breaches. 
Avoidance of the contract could create unjust results especially when there are claims 
paid by the insurer before the post-contractual breach took place. As a result, whilst 
remedy of avoidance is advantageous for insurers, the same is not necessarily the case 
for assured. In order to overcome such controversies it was once proposed that 
avoidance is appropriate to invoke in a post-contractual context in situations 
analogous to situations where the insurer has a right to terminate for breach.22 
Whether or not this solution could resolve the problem does not require any further 
discussion due to the changes made by the 2015 Act but in any case this opinion was 
not followed by any other later cases.  
 
Post-contractual duty of utmost good faith  
 
No definition of ‘the utmost good faith’ is provided by section 17 of the MIA 1906 
which appears to be unlimited in its scope.23 The common law established that the 
precise definition of the term ‘good faith’ depends on the legal context in which it is 
used.24 Sections 18-20 of the MIA 1906 illustrated the pre-contractual appearance of 
the duty of utmost good faith in relation to the representation of the risk. The duty of 
disclosure as defined by sections 18 to 20 only applied until the contract was made. It 
is undisputed that the parties are under the duty of observing the duty of utmost good 
faith throughout their contractual relationship.25  The pre-contractual duty is material 
to the making of the contract itself (or some variation of it) whereas the post-
contractual duty may prejudice the other party or cause him loss or destroy the 
continuing contractual relationship.26 One illustration of the post-contractual duty of 
good faith is seen in Drake Insurance Plc (In Provisional Liquidation) v Provident 
Insurance Plc27 in which the insurer prompted to avoid the contract for a pre-
contractual non-disclosure of a material fact. The court found that if the fact in 
question (the speeding conviction in the previous year) had been disclosed, that would 
have led increase in the premium, that then would have further led by the assured to 
disclose some other facts (an accident the year before which was disclosed as the 
assured’s fault whereas the assured was wholly innocent) which would have reduced 
the premium. Thus, there would have been no difference in the assessment of the 
premium if there had been full disclosure. In other words the insurers would not have 
been induced to enter into the contract on the facts as they were presented. The court 
also held that whilst there would have been no difference in outcome had there been 
full disclosure and the insurer knew about this at the time they attempted to avoid the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2001] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 563 para 35. 
23 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469 para 5, Lord Clyde.   
24 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469 para 48 Lord Hobhouse; Kelly v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 
(1996) 130 FLR 97.  
25 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469; Overseas Commodities v Style [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546 at 559.  
26 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 52 Lord Hobhouse. 
27 [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 268. 
contract, avoidance would have been an act in bad faith; in other words breach of the 
duty of good faith at a post-contractual stage. Another example of breach of the duty 
of good faith at the post-contractual stage was observed in Horwood v Land of 
Leather Ltd28 in which the assured signed a settlement agreement with the third party 
who is liable for the loss the assured suffered and claimed from the insurers. The 
settlement agreement provided that ‘no further claim will be made’ against the third 
party which would mean that there was no rights against the third party remained into 
which the insurer could subrogate. This was held by the court as breach of the post 
contractual duty of good faith as well as breach of an implied term of the contract 
regarding not to prejudice the insurer’s subrogation rights.  
 
There was a time at which making a fraudulent claim was regarded as breach of the 
post-contractual duty of good faith. This was however disapproved by later cases29 
and the Insurance Act 2015 codified the remedy for making a fraudulent claim by 
separating it from the post-contractual breach of the duty of good faith. If acting bad 
faith is also a proof of breach of the duty of good faith,30 making a fraudulent claim 
may be regarded as breach of the post contractual duty of good faith but the remedy 
for it will be forfeiture of the contract as set out by the 2015 Act.31  
 
The 2015 Act set out remedies for breach of the duty of fair presentation of the risk 
and clarified the remedy for making a fraudulent claim but it did not touch upon any 
aspects of the post-contractual duty of good faith. The repealed part of section 17 of 
the MIA 1906 used to express that the duty of good faith was mutually owed by the 
parties to a marine insurance contract. The insurer’s pre-contractual duty of fair 
presentation of the risk does not appear in the 2015 Act. Section 3(1) of the Act 
expressly states that the duty is owed by the assured. This may be justified by the 
reason of the nature of insurance and it is rarely32 the case that the insurer may be 
aware of some material facts at the pre-contractual stage which should be disclosed to 
the assured.33 The post-contractual duty of good faith, as mentioned above, is 
versatile. It is not possible to draw certain standards to define the forms that post-
contractual duty of good faith appears. Two cases mentioned above indicates how 
diverse the breaches of post contractual duty of good faith may be from case to case.  
 
 
The meaning of ‘utmost’ good faith  
 
The word ‘utmost’ does not appear in Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Carter v Boehm 
as the case reported in (1766) 3 Burrow 1905. The words ‘utmost good faith’ became 
current in the nineteenth century.34 The words seem to have derived from ‘uberrima 
fides’ which was said to be that35 “…if you know any circumstance at all that may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 [2010] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 453. 
29 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 71, Lord Hobhouse. 
30 Lord Scott stated in The Star Sea that ‘Unless the assured has acted in bad faith he cannot, in my 
opinion, be in breach of a duty of good faith, utmost or otherwise.’ [2003] 1 A.C. 469 para 111. 
31 Section 12. 
32 HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 483.  
33 Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co [1991] 2 A.C. 249. 
34 See The Star Sea, [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 47, Lord Hobhouse. 
35 Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App. Cas. 925; Rozanes v Bowen (1928) 32 Ll. L. Rep. 98, 102; 
Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 5, 
Lord Clyde. 
influence the underwriter's opinion as to the risk he is incurring, and consequently as 
to whether he will take it, or what premium he will charge if he does take it, you will 
state what you know.” In Britton v The Royal Insurance Company36 Willes J 
expressed the duty as ‘perfect good faith’. Similarly, in Bates v Hewitt37 Cockburn CJ 
described the duty as ‘full and perfect faith’. Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea defined 
it as ‘the most extensive, rather than the greatest’ good faith.38 In Australia under 
section 13 of the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (Cth)39 it is an implied term of an 
insurance contract to act with the utmost good faith which is a reciprocal duty on the 
parties to the insurance contracts.40 The word ‘utmost’ within this context was 
interpreted as to express the reciprocity; as Kirby J noted “Section 13 introduced the 
duty of good faith between insurer and assured on a ‘true quality of mutuality’”.41  
 
 
In Carter v Boehm Lord Mansfield was referring to a general duty that should apply 
to all types of contract42 but as the law developed it applied only to insurance 
contracts. The duty was referred to as non-concealment of material facts through 
which fair representation of the risk would be provided. This was also to prevent 
fraud and to ensure that the parties have their consents to the true facts of each case. 
In other words openness was at the route of the principles emphasised. At the pre-
contractual stage this objective can be achieved through the pre-contractual duty of 
fair presentation of the risk. Naturally, such duty comes to an end once the contract is 
made.43 The scope of the duty as explained in Carter v Boehm is broader than simply 
being limited to the duties set out by sections 18-20 of the MIA 1906 or section 3 of 
the Insurance Act 2015. Additionally, the modern cases recognised that the duty of 
utmost good faith also applies outside the context of pre-contractual presentation of 
the risk by the assured.44 As seen in the examples above the post-contractual duty of 
good faith appears in different forms in each case depending on its facts. Such duty 
may be argued in relation to the performance of a contractual duty, or making a claim 
in an honest manner,45 or not issuing a false document to prove a matter against the 
insurer.  
 All of these matters may also be contractually arranged by the parties but a 
contractual provision to this effect is not absolutely necessary. The duty of utmost 
good faith is over and above the contractual provisions, it derives from legislation, 
and applies throughout the contract. In Horwood v Land of Leather Ltd46 the assured’s 
breach in relation to the prejudicing the insurer’s subrogation rights was a breach of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Britton v The Royal Insurance Company (1866) 4 F. & F. 905, 909. The judge said “The contract of 
insurance is one of perfect good faith on both sides, and it is most important that such good faith should 
be maintained.” 
37 (1866-67) L.R. 2 Q.B. 595, 606. 
38 [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 44. 
39 ICA 1984 hereinafter. The Act does not apply to marine insurance or reinsurance. Section 9(1).  
40 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36 Kirby J para 127. 
41 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36 Kirby J para 176. 
42 Brownlie v Campbell (1880) 5 App. Cas. 925, 954 Lord Blackburn; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v 
Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 528 Lord Mustill; The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 
42, Lord Hobhouse. 
43 Insurance Act 2015 section 3(1). Cory v Patton (1873-74) L.R. 9 Q.B. 577. 
44 Colinvaux, para 6-006. 
45 For instance not concealing some facts from the insurer in making a claim see Cox v Bankside 
Members Agency Ltd [1995] C.L.C. 671, 680; Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V. v Mountain [1997] 
L.R.L.R. 523.  
46 [2010] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 453. 
an implied contractual term as well as a breach of the post contractual duty of good 
faith. The post-contractual breach of the duty of utmost good faith however may arise 
without a contractual breach. This is seen in Drake Insurance Plc (In Provisional 
Liquidation) v Provident Insurance Plc47 as mentioned above. Such diverse nature of 
the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith renders it very hard to set any clear-cut 
rules. As the law stands after the 2015 Act the position is left to the common law so 
that courts will provide, as justice requires, the definition, scope of the duty as well as 
the remedy for its breach. In Hormwood v Land of Leather the assured lost his claim 
under the insurance contract because of his breach. In Drake v Provident the insurers 
were not permitted to avoid the contract for the assured’s pre-contractual breach 
because the insurers’ avoidance under the circumstances would be in breach of the 
their duty utmost good faith. In some jurisdictions48 failure in making a timely 
response to a claim for indemnity may be regarded as breach of the post contractual 
duty of good faith. In English law the Courts49 rejected the claims for damages for 
late payment by the insurer. The Enterprise Bill which was introduced to Parliament 
in September 2015 included a section which provides “It is an implied term of 
every contract of insurance that if the insured  makes a claim under the 
contract, the insurer must pay any sums due  in respect of the claim within a 
reasonable time.”50 If the Bill is enacted, the assured will be able to claim 
contractual damages for breach of contract in addition to a right to enforce 
payment of the sums due for the loss under the insurance contract and any 
interest on that amount.51  
 
The post-contractual duty also varies depending on the nature of the insurance 
contract in question. In liability policies it is generally the case that the assured is 
required to transfer the control of the defence to a claim by a third party. In such a 
case interests of the assured and the insurers may not be the same but they will be 
required to act in good faith towards each other.52 If, for example, the limit of 
indemnity includes sums awarded by way of damages, interest and costs, insurers 
may be tempted to run up costs and exceed the policy limit to the detriment of the 
assured. The post-contractual duty of good faith would protect the assured by 
requiring the insurer to exercise his power to conduct the defence in good faith.  
 
The insurance (or reinsurance) contract may expressly provide that the insurer shall 
take control of the claim against the assured“in the spirit of good faith and fair 
dealing”.53 This wording was held to qualify the control and power the reinsurers 
have under the reinsurance contract. Accordingly, the reinsurers were ‘to act honestly 
and conscionably vis-à-vis the other parties to the contracts’. The test to determine 
whether insurers (or reinsurers as the case may be) are acting in a “businesslike 
manner in the spirit of good faith and fair dealing” was described as an objective test 
which is capable of review by a Court. If the court concludes that insurer were acting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 268. 
48 For instance in Australia : CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36. 
49 Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 111; Ventouris v Mountain (The Italia 
Express) (No.3) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 281. 
50 Clause 13A(1). 
51 Clause 13A(5). 
52 K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Lloyd's Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2001] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 563 para 22. 
53 Federal-Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust v Federal-Mogul Ltd (formerly T&N Plc) [2014] 
Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 671. 
in a manner which was not “businesslike” in the spirit of good faith and fair dealing, 
such unbusinesslike conduct would constitute an ordinary breach of contract by 
insurers (for the reason that this is a contractual provision). But as seen above such a 
conduct is also capable of being described as against the post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith.  
 
The pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith is less elusive; its scope is two fold: the 
duty of disclosure and the duty not to misrepresent material facts. The test of 
materiality was established by the common law54 and was codified by the Insurance 
Act 2015.55 The 2015 Act also provides examples56 of material facts and a list of facts 
that need not be disclosed.57 Schedule 1 to the 2015 Act clearly set out a proportionate 
remedy for its breach. By such structure the duty is designed to apply at the pre 
contractual stage in a way capable of achieving its objectives stated above. Although 
the same clear operational structure is not available for the post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith it is undisputed that it encompasses notions of ‘fairness, 
reasonableness and community standards of decency and fair dealing’.58 In The Star 
Sea Lord Scott referred to the word ‘honesty’.59 In emphasising the differences 
between the pre and post contractual duties of utmost good faith his Lordship noted 
that the word ‘utmost’ does not affect the point.60 The Australian courts held that a 
lack of utmost good faith is not to be equated with dishonesty only.61 The absence of 
honesty on the part of an insurer (or assured) will attract the finding of a breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith however, this does not mean that a want of honesty is a 
universal feature of a want of the utmost good faith in this context.62 The High Court 
of Australia expressed that utmost good faith may require an insurer to act with due 
regard to the legitimate interests of an assured, as well as to its own interests.63 The 
criteria of dishonesty, caprice and unreasonableness express the ambit of what 
constitutes a breach of the implied duty of utmost good faith.64 
 
It is not clear under the current wording of section 17 of the MIA 1906 when the duty 
of utmost good faith comes to an end. It was held in English law before the 2015 Act 
that once the parties become engaged in litigation, their relationship is governed by 
the rules of court contained in the Civil Procedure Rules which supersedes the duty of 
utmost good faith.65 It	  was	  held	  in	  The	  Star	  Sea	  that	  when a writ is issued the rights 
of the parties are crystallised. The function of the litigation is to ascertain what those 
rights are and grant the appropriate remedy. There are important changes in the 
parties’ relationship that come about when the litigation starts. The battle lines have 
been drawn and new remedies are available to the parties under the procedural rules. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501. 
55 Section 7.  
56 Section 7(4). 
57 Section 3(5). 
58 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J, 
para 15. 
59 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 102, Lord Scott. 
60 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 95, Lord Scott. 
61 Callinan and Heydon JJ, para 257. 
62 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36, para 15, Gleeson CJ and 
Crennan J, para 130, Kirby J. 
63 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36, para 15, Gleeson CJ and 
Crennan J. 
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Less controversies regarding the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith –both on 
the insurer and assured- arise in some other jurisdictions. Under section 13(1) of the 
Australian ICA 1984 (Cth) “A contract of insurance is a contract based on the utmost 
good faith and there is implied in such a contract a provision requiring each party to it 
to act towards the other party, in respect of any matter arising under or in relation to 
it, with the utmost good faith.”66 
The scope of section 13(1) was discussed extensively in CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP 
Financial Planning Pty Ltd67 in which the assured purchased a professional indemnity 
insurance in relation to its business that providing financial planning advice to retail 
investors. The business was conducted through the medium of representatives holding 
proper authorities. The assured had become aware of the fact that two of those 
representatives gave unsatisfactory financial advice to investors and informed the 
insurer of possible claims against it by persons who were clients of the two 
individuals. There followed a long period of communications between the insurer and 
the assured. During that period, the insurer advised the assured to act as a prudent 
uninsured. The assured considered that it had a liability towards a number of investors 
and, without any of those investors making a claim as defined under the insurance 
policy, proceeded to enter into settlements with those investors. The insurer however 
denied liability. The assured argued that the insurer’s denial of liability was a breach 
of the statutory requirement of utmost good faith. It is understood from the High 
Court’s decision that the following conducts of the insurer, in principle, might be 
regarded as breach of section 13(1) of the ICA 1984: (1) The insurers agreed with the 
assured in principle to a protocol for handling relevant claims against the assured and 
told the assured to act as a “prudent uninsured”. (2) Following that they allowed the 
processing of such claims (which necessarily had, as they knew, to be dealt with 
efficiently and fairly) to proceed to successive settlements over nearly two years 
without indicating one way or the other whether they admitted or denied indemnity. 
(3) The insurers also repeatedly received large amounts of material from the assured 
and failed to give relevant and timely responses to that material.  
 
Nevertheless the assured was not able to enforce his action on the breach of section 
13(1) for the reason that he could have but he did not try to enforce the senior counsel 
clause in the insurance contract.68 The principle applied was that of “a plaintiff 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Section 13, before it was amended in 2013 did not used to empower a court to make a finding of liability 
against an insurer as a punitive sanction for not acting in good faith. As added by the Insurance Contracts 
Amendment Act 2013 section 13(2) of the ICA 1984 provides that “A failure by a party to a contract of 
insurance to comply with the provision implied in the contract by subsection (1) is a breach of the 
requirements of this Act.” The significance of the extension is that it becomes possible for the regulator, the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission, to bring representative proceedings on behalf of an 
assured harmed by a breach of duty on the part of the insurer. Private enforcement is thus boosted by the 
possibility of the proceedings being run (and funded) by ASIC. Secondly, new s 14A of the 1984 Act 
extends the powers of ASIC where an insurer has failed to comply with the duty of utmost good faith in the 
specific contexts of the handling or settlement of claims. In that situation, s 14A authorises ASIC to exercise 
its regulatory powers under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), so that there may be administrative sanctions 
potentially leading to a withdrawal of authorisation. See Colinvaux para 6-007. 
67 [2007] HCA 36. 
68 “ (a)  Unless a Senior Counsel, that We and the Insured both agree to instruct, advises that the Claim 
proceedings should be contested, then neither We nor the Insured can require the other to contest any 
legal proceedings about a Claim if the other does not agree to do so. 
  (b)  In formulating his or her advice, Senior Counsel must be instructed to consider: 
seeking relief not himself be guilty of tainted relevant conduct.”69 The High Court 
expressed that “utmost good faith will usually require something more than passivity: 
it will usually require affirmative or positive action on the part of a person owing a 
duty of it”.70 The assured seemed to have chosen either to ignore, or deliberately not 
to invoke, the senior counsel clause of the policies.71 The High Court held that it 
would have been breach of the utmost good faith if the insurer had been asked but 
refused to co-operate in the choice of, and obtaining of advice from, senior counsel. 72 
 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
It appears that the contracts of marine and non-marine insurance are contracts based 
upon the utmost good faith. It is undisputed that the utmost good faith in the context 
of insurance contracts reflects the degrees of openness and fair dealing required of the 
parties in the various stages of their relationship.73 Such objective is achieved at the 
pre-contractual stage by virtue of the duty of the fair presentation of the risk. It is 
however elusive at the post-contractual stage at which the openness and fair dealing 
appears in different forms at different types of insurance contract. In the liability 
insurance context for instance the insurer is expected to regard the assured’s as well 
as his own interests where interests of the parties are not the same (for instance where 
the insurers takes over the defence to the third party claim against the assured). It 
seems that the word ‘utmost’ does not add much to the duty to act in good faith. 
Several other words were used to describe the utmost nature of the duty, eg ‘perfect’ 
or ‘full’ duty of good faith. But what lies in the heart of the utmost good faith is not 
the terminology used but the manner that the parties adopt in their contractual 
relationship. It is submitted that if the word ‘utmost’ was omitted, the duty of good 
faith would, in nature, would not be interpreted as differently to the interpretations 
referred to above. With the word utmost or without preceding the ‘duty of good faith’ 
a party who prejudiced insurers’ subrogation rights is likely to be held in breach of the 
post-contractual duty of good faith (as well as breach of an implied term of the 
insurance contract). Whether utmost or otherwise, making a fraudulent claim would 
still be in breach of the duty of good faith remedy of which is codified by the 2015 
Act. The emphasis is openness and fair dealing in ‘dealings of the parties to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  (i)  The economics of the matter; and 
  (ii)  The damages and costs likely to be recovered; and 
  (iii)  The likely costs of defence; and 
  (iv)  The Insured's prospects of successfully defending the claim. 
  (c)  The cost of Senior Counsel's opinion is to be taken as part of the Claim Investigation 
Costs. 
  (d)  If Senior Counsel advises that the matter should be settled and if the terms of settlement 
are within limits which are reasonable (in Senior Counsel's opinion and in the light of the 
matters he/she is required to consider), then: 
  (i)  the Insured cannot (subject to Section 7.7, Insured's right to contest) object to the 
settlement; and 
  (ii)  the Insured must immediately pay the relevant Excess or Excesses listed in the 
Schedule.” 
69 [2007] HCA 36, para 257, Callinan and Heydon JJ. 
70 [2007] HCA 36, para 257, Callinan and Heydon JJ. 
71 [2007] HCA 36, para 260, Callinan and Heydon JJ. 
72 [2007] HCA 36, para 260, Callinan and Heydon JJ. 
73 The Star Sea [2003] 1 A.C. 469, para 7, Lord Clyde.  
insurance contract with each other’.74 The court would objectively assess whether the 
parties were open, fair, businesslike, reasonable and honest in their contractual 
dealings. It is also clear that it is not an absolute duty;75 the substance of the 
obligation which is entailed can vary according to the context in which the matter 
comes to be judged.76 
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